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NOTES AND COMMENT
Constitutional Law: Creation of State Debt in Excess of Con-
stitutional Provision: Delegation of Legislative Power.
Loomis v. Callahan, 22o N.W. 816, is an action to enjoin the annuity
board of the state retirement system from paying out trust funds
of the state retirement system to the University Building Corporation
for the purpose of equipping the Memorial Union Building and con-
structing a field house upon the lands belonging to the State University.
A demurrer to the complaint is sustained and the action dismissed.
Action pursuant to state statutes 36.o6, subsections 6 and 7, the
board of regents of the State University entered into a lease with the
University Building Corporation relating to certain university lands,
upon which there was under construction the Memorial Union Build-
ing, for a term of 5o years at a rental of $i.oo for the full term of
said lease, and on the same day the University Building Corporation
leased the same property to the regents for an indefinite period at the
annual rental of $37,245.52.
The board of regents also adopted a resolution authorizing the
Wisconsin University Building Corporation to contract for decorating
furniture, fixtures and equipment for the Memorial Building for an
amount not to exceed $4oo,ooo. The board also provided for the
collection of a fee from each student to be known as the memorial
union fee, "to be used for the operation and maintenance of Univer-
sity Buildings devoted to the men's and women's all-university social
activities, chiefly the memorial union."
The regents also leased to the above building corporation such uni-
versity lands belonging to the university campus for a term of fifty
years and for the same amount of rent as set out in the above lease
upon condition that the building corporation erect a field house thereon
and equip the same for the use of the regents of the university. The
building corporation then leased the proposed lands and field house
back to the regents upon terms similar to those contained in the lease of
the Memorial Union Building.
Upon application made by the annuity board of the state retirement
system (Chapt. 42, sec. 20 to 54 inclusive of Wis. Statutes.) resolved
to loan to the building corporation the sum of $4oo,ooo at 4Y per
cent, amortized over a period of 15 years upon the lease hold
security which the building corporation had in the memorial union
building and likewise the annuity board resolved to extend to the
building corporation a loan of $326,ooo at 42 per cent on a thirty
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year amortized plan upon the lease-hold interests of the building
corporation in the field house.
The Wisconsin University Building Corporation is organized for
the declared purpose of buying, selling, leasing, and otherwise dis-
posing and acquiring real estate and constructing, equipping and fur-
nishing buildings or other permanent improvements thereon or other
exclusive uses, purposes and benefits of the University of Wisconsin
and generally to carry out the purposes of sub. sections 6 and 7 of
sec. 36.o6 of the Wis. Statutes. "The corporation shall be non-stock
and no dividends or pecuniary profits shall be declared to the members
thereof."
This action is brought by the plaintiff, who is a real estate owner,
taxpayer, and teacher in the public schools of the state, and who is,
and for some time has been a contributing member of the state re-
tirement system to enjoin the annuity board from completing such
loans as set out above.
His cause of action is based upon the grounds that Statute 36.06 is
unconstitutional under the following:
i. The leasing of the campus lands to the Building Corporation
is invalid in that it gives state property to private corporations for
private purposes without just compensation.
2. The credit of the state is being loaned in the aid of individual
association or corporation.
3. The transaction results in the indebtedness on the State in excess
of $oo,ooo.
4. The legislation constitutes a delegation of legislative powers to
the board of regents of the University.
In sustaining the demurrer the court has the following to say to
the contentions set out by the plaintiff:
i. The leasing of the campus lands to the building corporation
did not constitute the giving of the state property to a private cor-
poration for private purposes without compensation. "The University
owned the lands and needed the buildings. The money with which
to erect the buildings is not available in any other manner than by the
leasing of the buildings to third persons such third persons to finance
the erection and make it available for the University upon terms which
will enable the university in time to pay for the building out of the
earnings from operation and management. This certainly furnishes
a consideration which supports the lease and renders the transaction
immune from the charge that public property is being given for private
use without compensation."
2. The above consideration also demonstrates that by the trans-
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action, the credit of the state is not being loaned in the aid of any
individual corporation or association."
3. "The transaction does not result in an indebtedness on the part
of the state. Under the plan the only obligation entered into by any-
one representing the State or with power to bind the State is the
obligation to pay the designated rent stipulated by the terms of the
lease running from the building corporation to the board of regents.
But for this purpose only, the proceeds arising from the operation of
the leased premises are to be applied upon the payment of the rent.
The regents are free at their election to abandon the plan of acquiring
or holding that which prior to the contract they did not own. (The land
was owned by the university.) The board of regents acquired an
interest in the property which it did not have. In purchasing that
property it does not pledge the general credit of the state. It pledges
to the payment for the property moneys acquired from the operation
of the property thus acquired."
4. As to the delegation of legislative powers to the board, the court
merely said, "that this was merely a duty imposed by the legislature
upon the board in order that the purpose of the statute might be
carried out." MORGAN MALONEY
Constitutional Law: Due Process: Price-Fixing Legislation.
When supported and accelerated by a general public interest in the
matter which it seeks to control or regulate, police power knows nor
recognizes no law. But when that necessary element of "public inter-
est" is lacking, police power is a cart sans wheels.
The instant case' presents a discussion of what constitutes a pub-
lic interest of quality sufficient to warrant price fixing legislation.
Here a statute required all persons who sought to establish employ-
ment agencies to procure licenses from the commissioner of labor of
that state, providing a penalty for failure to do so. Applicants were
required to submit to the commissioner a schedule of fees which they
proposed to charge for services in the conduct of such agencies. The
commissioner of labor was empowered by the same statute to reject
applicants "for any good cause shown within the meaning of this act."
The case at hand was precipitated by the refusal of the commissioner
of labor to issue a license to the appellant on the sole ground that, in
his opinion, the proposed fees were exorbitant and unreasonable.
In reply to the appellant's contention that the attempt to confer upon
the commissioner of labor the power to fix prices in the manner de-
scribed above contravenes the due process clause of the Constitution,
'Ribnik v. McBride, 48 S. Ct. Rep. 545.
